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ABSTRACT 
 
Deweyan Naturalism: A Critique of Epistemic Reductionism.  (May 2011) 
Richard Thorp Tucker III, B.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Gregory Fernando Pappas 
 
 This thesis articulates a critique of scientific naturalism from the perspective of 
John Dewey.  Scientific naturalism can be defined by two explicit, metaphysical 
commitments, one ontological and one epistemological.  Implicit to these commitments 
is a further commitment concerning the nature of human experience.  This understanding 
of human experience can be described as epistemic reductionism because it reduces the 
whole of experience and all empiricism to epistemology. 
    Scientific naturalism is the orthodox position for most contemporary, Anglo-
American philosophy.  Many philosophers within this tradition are dissatisfied with 
scientific naturalism and attempt to critique scientific naturalism from the perspective of 
“liberal” naturalism.  One major objection from the liberal perspective concerns the 
ontology and placement of moral qualities: where are moral qualities to be placed in a 
scientifically naturalistic ontology?  However, due to the fact that liberal naturalists 
share with scientific naturalists a commitment to an epistemically reductionistic 
understanding of the nature of human experience, liberal naturalism fails to adequately 
address the placement problem.     
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 John Dewey‟s understanding of human experience rejects the ontological 
interpretation of the dualisms which are presupposed by both scientific and liberal 
naturalism, such as the subject/object dichotomy, the dualism between the self and the 
world, and between subjective and objective experience.  Since Dewey rejects these 
dualisms, he also rejects language which would “place” moral qualities on either side of 
this ontological division.   
 In place of these ontological dualisms, Dewey asserts a functional distinction 
between primary and secondary experience in which the world is fundamentally 
experienced in its qualitative determinations and is only experienced reflectively 
(epistemically) when particular problematic situations arise and particular concrete 
inquiries are required.  Concrete inquiries are initiated and regulated by felt qualities 
which represent disequilibrium between man and his environing conditions, and these 
qualities can be scientific, moral, aesthetic, political, or religious in nature.  Felt qualities 
are found in experience, and as such, can be said to reveal genuine traits of nature.  
Through critiquing the epistemic reductionism common to both scientific and liberal 
naturalism, Dewey dissolves the metaphilosophical assumptions which give rise to the 
placement problem. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In my thesis I have attempted to define a particular philosophical position which 
has become dominant in Anglo-American philosophy, as well as critique that position 
from the Deweyan perspective.  Mario De Caro and David Macarthur have termed this 
position scientific naturalism, and while I take their critique of scientific naturalism to be 
worthwhile and important, I think the focus of their critique is too narrow.  De Caro and 
Macarthur have compiled two volumes dedicated to the critique of scientific naturalism 
from the perspective of liberal naturalism, a version of naturalism equally rooted in the 
analytic tradition.  I believe that any critique of scientific naturalism from within the 
analytic tradition will not be strong enough, given that there are fundamental 
assumptions about human experience, the world, and philosophy which are common to 
the vast majority of philosophers within this tradition.  In fact, scientific naturalism is the 
received view, or is mainstream orthodoxy for analytic philosophy today, and as such, 
any critique of scientific naturalism from within the analytic tradition may not be able to 
get at the source of the problem.   
 In order to attempt a broader critique than De Caro and Macarthur, I have 
adopted the term epistemic reductionism to describe these fundamental assumptions 
common to both scientific and liberal naturalists.  While liberal naturalists seek to 
critique the core ontological and epistemological commitments of scientific naturalism, 
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they still share an understanding of human experience which makes their critique less 
profound than it needs to be. 
 John Dewey critiqued this analytic understanding of experience over a century 
ago.  In his article “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism”, he critiqued an 
understanding of experience which viewed knowing as the sole and only genuine mode 
of experience.  The idea that the world is only or is most fundamentally, experienced as 
known, is that which is common to both scientific and liberal naturalism.  Though this 
idea is overwhelmingly pervasive, it is often implicit, and for this reason, I felt 
compelled to draw explicit attention to it in my thesis. 
 Epistemic reductionism, that is, the reduction of all experience and all 
empiricism to epistemology, is unwittingly accepted as fact by most of my fellow 
students.  In both professional and casual conversation, it is apparent to me that this is 
the received view and that it is received dogmatically.  The analytic attitude can be 
expressed thusly: “The notion that philosophy and philosophical analysis is properly 
concerned with the world as it is known, is surely something of which every freshman 
philosophy major is aware.  To question this is not just to do philosophy differently; it is 
to cease doing philosophy.  Perhaps it is literary criticism, psychology, sociology, or 
something “continental” in flavor which the questioner means to concern himself with, 
but it is not really philosophy in the robust, rigorous sense which we analytic 
philosophers take it to be.”  It is this disposition which I mean to undermine by 
contrasting Dewey‟s naturalism with the epistemically reductionistic forms of naturalism 
typical of analytic philosophy. 
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 My main argument is that epistemic reductionism is not just a feature of 
scientific naturalism, but is a feature of the whole analytic tradition, whether understood 
scientifically or liberally.  However, in order to condense this argument, I have isolated 
De Caro and Macarthur‟s definition of scientific naturalism, as I believe it cleanly and 
succinctly articulates the central features of this philosophical position.  I believe these 
central features would be accepted by any self-proclaimed scientific naturalist, but I also 
believe that anyone accepting that label would implicitly (or perhaps explicitly) accept 
epistemic reductionism.   
 Dewey called epistemic reductionism by the name Intellectualism and, as I 
mentioned, authored a critique of it over a century ago.  But his critique of 
Intellectualism has either been ignored or misunderstood by contemporary analytic 
philosophy.  I don‟t believe this is because there is anything wrong with Dewey‟s 
critique, and as such, I have not sought to alter its content.  What I have attempted to do 
is bring this critique into the contemporary debate about what kinds of things should be 
accepted by an empirically naturalistic account. 
 Scientific naturalism is a cluster of ontological, metaphysical and 
epistemological presuppositions which I have attempted to present in a linear fashion.  In 
linear form, I understand scientific naturalism to be committed to an epistemological 
theme, that is, that scientific inquiry is our only source of genuine knowledge.  As a 
direct result of this epistemological commitment, an ontological commitment arises, 
namely, that we should only accept those entities to which successful scientific 
explanations commit us.  Implicit to both of these commitments is an understanding of 
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human experience which is best described as epistemically reductionistic.  In fact, it is 
this understanding of human experience which is the most central assumption of 
scientific naturalism, even if it is only implicit.  Therefore, scientific naturalism can be 
understood thusly: there is an implicit notion of human experience which yields an 
explicit notion of epistemology, which in turn yields a sparse ontology. 
 Alternatively, Dewey articulates an understanding of human experience which 
directly yields his ontology; there is no intermediate epistemological commitment.  
Dewey‟s understanding of experience, coupled with its resulting ontology, is called 
Immediate Empiricism, and it is the idea that things are what they are experienced to be.  
Essentially, however a thing presents itself in experience is the way it really is, and as 
such, it reveals genuine traits of nature.  One should not attempt to transform the thing as 
experienced into something else due to a priori metaphysical or methodological 
commitments.  Treating things as known, even when they are not experienced as known, 
is thoroughly unempirical, and this is the direct result of an a priori understanding of 
experience, and what Dewey calls the philosophical fallacy.  If the success of scientific 
advancement has revealed anything, it is that the way forward must be thoroughly 
empirical; however, that is not to say that empiricism must be reduced to science or 
epistemology. 
 The reason for this is that science and epistemology are both reflective processes 
which arise out of our primary, qualitative experience of the world.  One experiences the 
world in a fundamentally qualitative manner and it is only when one encounters specific 
problematic situations that the world is treated scientifically or epistemically.  In other 
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words, these modes of experience (scientific or epistemic) are not one‟s primary modes 
of experiencing the world, much less one‟s only modes of experiencing the world.  
However, it is clear to all that the precision and clarity which the epistemic treatment of 
things provides is exceedingly useful for resolving problematic situations.  The 
usefulness of knowledge in an uncertain world makes knowledge exceedingly valuable.  
Philosophically, this superior value has often been equated with superior being, and thus, 
in the history of western philosophy, known objects have been accorded a superior 
ontological status.  Today, in scientific naturalism, known objects are accorded an 
exclusive ontological status, as they are the only objects which are declared to be 
objectively in the world. 
 This exclusive pursuit of known objects is what Dewey calls the quest for 
certainty.  While there is no sense in which Dewey rejects the attempt to understand the 
world as known, he emphatically denies that this is the only manner in which the world 
is experienced.  The attempt to understand the world as known is a noble and necessary 
pursuit, as it is the best means one has to assess and manipulate environing conditions in 
order to ameliorate uncertainty and one‟s sense of peril.  However, it is this uncertain 
standing in a precarious world which gives rise to the quest for certainty.  One does not 
seek to express the world as certain because it is certain; one seeks to express the world 
as certain because it is precarious. 
 One central problem which results from the received view is called the placement 
problem.  What is the ontological status of moral qualities and values according to 
scientific naturalism?  Where can they be placed in the world as it is understood by 
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scientific naturalism?  Scientific naturalism asserts that moral qualities and values are 
not objectively in nature because they are not known, or revealed, by scientific inquiry.  
As such they are subjective judgments which are projected onto the world by an 
antecedently independent subject.   
 This answer to the placement problem reveals another fundamental assumption 
of scientific naturalism, namely, the subject/object dichotomy, which is scientific 
naturalism‟s principle ontological presupposition.  The content of this presupposition is 
that man and the world are ontologically distinct, that there is something peculiar about 
the mental activity of man which ontologically distinguishes him from his world, just as 
mental entities such as propositions and concepts are ontologically distinct from the 
empirical objects of scientific inquiry.  Because scientific inquiry cannot investigate 
moral qualities and values, they must not reveal anything about the world, and must be 
placed on the subjective side of the subject/object dichotomy. 
 Dewey rejects this ontological dualism between subject and object, and therefore, 
cannot accept scientific naturalism‟s answer to the placement problem.  In fact, because 
Dewey rejects this ontological dualism, he does not accept any subjective account, nor 
any objective account, for both are equally unempirical. 
 In order to determine the ontological status of moral qualities and values, one 
must return to Dewey‟s nondualistic immediate empiricism.  Is the world experienced as 
moral?  Do morally problematic situations arise?  Are moral qualities pervasive to some 
inquiries?  The answer to all these questions is “yes” and therefore, Dewey takes moral 
qualities and values to reveal genuine traits of nature.  Just as epistemic and scientific 
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qualities are found in experience, so are moral qualities, and thus, they should be placed 
on equal ontological footing with these other qualities. 
 While Dewey‟s moral philosophy is richer and more complex than what I will 
present it to be, my presentation of it here is only meant to establish how Dewey would 
answer the placement problem, a problem which is ontological in nature.  Because moral 
qualities and values present themselves in experience, they can be said to reveal genuine 
traits of nature.  But this does not just speak to the placement problem of moral qualities 
and values.  It also provides the philosophical method for treating all affective and 
emotive qualities which are experienced in an empirical manner, such as aesthetic, 
political, and religious qualities.  This was, after all, one of Dewey‟s primary concerns: 
to articulate an empirical method of philosophy which would treat things as they were 
experienced, and not in a scientifically or epistemically reductionistic manner. 
 In the second section I present Dewey‟s critique of scientific naturalism.  First, I 
use the work of Mario De Caro, David Macarthur, and Charles Guignon to help define 
what the core commitments of scientific naturalism are.  Next, I define the placement 
problem, a problem which reflects the uncertain ontological status of normative values 
within the framework of scientific naturalism.  I then comment on the place accorded to 
Dewey in De Caro and Macarthur‟s work by taking a critical look at the only contributor 
to their volumes who discusses Dewey.  Peter Godfrey-Smith treats Dewey as though he 
were a liberal naturalist because he misunderstands the potency of Dewey‟s critique of 
epistemic reductionism.  This shows that even though it is recognized by some that a 
new form of naturalism which is not as narrow and reductionistic as scientific naturalism 
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must be brought forth, no one in the analytic tradition has taken Dewey‟s version of 
naturalism seriously enough to consider it a viable alternative.  Finally, I present three 
specific criticism of scientific naturalism from a Deweyan perspective.  These three 
criticisms concern (a) the environmental and moral nature of the motivations for 
accepting scientific naturalism, (b) the unempirical philosophical worldview which 
results from scientific naturalism, and (c) the fact that all empirical inquiry cannot be 
reduced to scientific inquiry.  
 In the third section I present the Deweyan alternative to scientific naturalism.  Of 
principle importance is the different manner in which Dewey conceives of the nature and 
operations of experience.  First, I outline the distinction between primary and secondary 
experience.  Next, I place this distinction within its environing context, and discuss how 
the distinction between primary and secondary experience arises when man as organism 
moves throughout the world, attempting to establish harmonious relation with it.  Then, I 
outline Dewey‟s general pattern of inquiry in order to provide an ideal formalization of 
the emergence of primary and secondary experience from its environing context.  These 
central ideas of Dewey provide the background for a direct discussion of the 
nonsubjective nature of pervasive qualities.  Finally, I present a brief outline of Dewey‟s 
notion of moral inquiry.  This outline is offered in order to demonstrate how moral 
inquiry might proceed given that normative values are no longer considered subjective, 
but are taken to reveal genuine traits of nature
1
. 
 
                                                 
1
 John Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Vol. 1, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), 24. 
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2. EPISTEMIC REDUCTIONISM 
 
2.1 Naturalism 
  
 Naturalism is a label with which most contemporary, Anglo-American 
philosophers are comfortable.  Many think of themselves and their projects in 
naturalistic terms, and understand philosophy in a naturalistic fashion.  But there is much 
disagreement about what naturalism is and what kinds of things should included in a 
naturalistic account of the world.  For, as many philosophers as self-identify as 
naturalists, there may be that many definitions of naturalism.   
 Negatively, a naturalistic theory of the world would reject an appeal to 
supernatural entities and events.  God, spirits, demons, ghosts, souls, magic, and 
miracles are the types of things which are disallowed in any naturalistic account.  And 
while at first glance, it may appear that naturalism simply rejects immaterial things or 
events, this is not the case.  Minimally, numbers, propositions, and concepts are 
immaterial things which all naturalists acknowledge as critical to any account of the 
world.  Even beyond these commonly accepted things though, there are other kinds of 
immaterial entities with which some naturalists are quite comfortable.  Some naturalists 
suggest that minds, consciousness, and human agency may be immaterial, yet 
naturalistic things or events.  And some naturalists attempt to account for moral values in 
naturalistic terms.   
 Clearly, then, a positive account of naturalism becomes more difficult to 
articulate.  Where can the line be drawn, and on what grounds might a line be drawn 
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between those things which are included and those which are excluded from a 
naturalistic account?    
 
2.2 Scientific Naturalism 
  
Mario De Caro and David Macarthur have co edited two volumes in which these 
concerns are explicitly discussed.  In both volumes, De Caro and Macarthur choose to 
differentiate between scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism.  Both authors take 
scientific naturalism to be the “current orthodoxy” for contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophy.  As such, their notion of scientific naturalism serves an important function in 
their discussion of naturalism as it represents the status quo within the naturalistic 
community to be critiqued.  In Naturalism in Question, naturalistic accounts of mind, 
agency, aesthetics, and morality are articulated from what they have called the “liberal” 
perspective.  In Naturalism and Normativity, more attention is devoted to normative 
values, but also to the relationship between philosophy and the natural sciences, 
philosophy and the human sciences, meta-ethics, epistemology, and human nature in 
general, again from the liberal perspective.  For De Caro and Macarthur, “liberal” simply 
means a more inclusive sense of what constitutes a natural thing or naturalism.
2
  In 
neither volume do they attempt a positive definition of liberal naturalism, instead using 
the term in the most general way possible, almost in a purely negative fashion; liberal 
                                                 
 
2
 The authors make mention of several other labels for nonscientific naturalism, of which liberal is just 
one.  “Apart from being united with scientific naturalists in this negative conception of naturalism, most of 
our authors hope for a new, more substantive, nonscientific naturalism distinct from the scientific (or, 
better, scientistic) naturalism that is currently so influential.  In this spirit, John Dupré, has endorsed 
„pluralistic naturalism,‟ Jennifer Hornsby, „naïve naturalism,‟ John McDowell, a „liberal naturalism,‟ and 
Barry Stroud, a „more open minded or expansive naturalism.‟”  
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naturalism could be read simply as “not scientific naturalism,” or “naturalism divorced 
from scientism.”   
 De Caro and Macarthur define scientific naturalism with reference to two 
themes, or doctrines, which are formed around some basic concepts to which any 
scientific naturalist might assent.  They are the ontological and epistemological
3
 themes 
of scientific naturalism.  According to the ontological theme, “the world consists of 
nothing but the entities to which successful scientific explanations commit us.”4  This 
theme explicitly addresses the question concerning what types of things can be included 
within a naturalistic account. 
Schematically, the first theme is a commitment to a scientism that says 
not only that modern (or post-seventeenth-century) natural science 
provides a true picture of nature but, more contentiously, that it is the 
only true picture.  Wilfred Sellars expresses its animating spirit in his 
remark that “science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and 
of what is not that it is not.”5 
 
 The epistemological theme of scientific naturalism states that “it is only by 
following the method of the natural sciences…that one arrives at genuine knowledge”6; 
or, put another way, “scientific inquiry is in principle, our only genuine source of 
                                                 
3
 In their works, De Caro and Macarthur label these themes as the ontological and methodological themes.  
However, they define this theme in a variety of ways which, while not unrelated, are not always clear.  In 
addition, they note that the methodological theme has a specifically epistemological component, and as 
such, I have used the label epistemological instead of methodological, while also selecting this specifically 
epistemological component of their definition.  The other component, the one more properly called the 
methodological, relates explicitly to the relation between philosophy and science, as well as Quine‟s 
rejection of First Philosophy.  The methodological component of scientific naturalism will not be 
addressed in this paper. 
4
 Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, “Science, Naturalism, and the Problem of Normativity,” in 
Naturalism and Normativity, ed. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 4. 
5
 Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, “Introduction: The Nature of Naturalism.” in Naturalism in 
Question, ed. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 4. 
6
 Ibid., 7.  
  
 
12 
knowledge or understanding.”7  De Caro and Macarthur think that these two themes 
could be pulled apart.  Essentially, one could be an ontological scientific naturalist, i.e., 
someone who accepts the ontological theme, but does so for reasons other than those 
articulated in the epistemological theme.  For example, one could be a scientific 
naturalist who holds to certain philosophical premises which establish “the 
presuppositions, extent, and limits of knowledge and epistemology,”8 therefore leading 
one to have the ontology specified by the ontological theme. 
 However, it is unlikely that one could accept the epistemological theme without 
also accepting the ontological theme.  “An [epistemological] scientific naturalist will 
presumably endorse the ontological theme on the ground that scientific inquiry has 
ontological presuppositions and implications.”9  In other words, the ontological theme is 
a direct implication of this view of scientific inquiry.  More needs to be said about what 
constitutes the ontological presuppositions of scientific inquiry, but I agree that it is fair 
to say that any scientific naturalist who accepts the epistemological theme will also 
accept the ontological theme.  I will identify the initial acceptance of the epistemological 
theme which leads to the acceptance of the ontological theme by the label 
epistemological scientific naturalism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 De Caro and Macarthur, “Science, Naturalism, and the Problem of Normativity”, 4. 
8
 De Caro and Macarthur, “Introduction: The Nature of Naturalism”, 6. 
9
 Ibid., 6-7. 
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2.3 Charles Guignon and Ontological Presuppositions 
In a work entitled “The Ontological Presuppositions of the Determinist Free Will 
Debate” Charles Guignon criticizes a set of ontological presuppositions from a 
Heideggerian perspective.  Guignon calls the set of ontological presuppositions which he 
criticizes the modern, scientific worldview, which is a way of viewing of the world that 
results from the historical development of scientific inquiry.  Since the beginning of the 
development of the natural sciences in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, the conclusions of 
scientific inquiry have changed the manner in which man understands his place in the 
world, as well as how he relates to and understands the world around him. 
 Guignon condenses the modern, scientific worldview into five basic assumptions. 
The upshot of the rise of modern science has been a cluster of basic 
assumptions that color our understanding of ourselves and our world.  We 
understand ourselves in terms of the subject/object dichotomy, according 
to which we are entities who are set over against, though interacting with, 
the surrounding material world.  We assume that reality, at its most basic 
level, consists of material substances in causal interactions.  We believe 
that even if all phenomena are not reducible to the physical level, the 
physical constrains what can count as an explanation in any area.  We 
think that the kind of explanation found in classical physics is the 
paradigm for explanation in any area of inquiry.  And, consequently, we 
assume that making things intelligible is a matter of showing how those 
things are caused to be, where the relevant causes are seen as law-
governed efficient causes.
10
 
    
I think that Guignon‟s articulation of the basic assumptions of the modern, 
scientific worldview generalizes nicely, that it can be applied to De Caro and 
                                                 
10
 Charles Guignon, “The Ontological Presuppositions of the Determinism-Free Will Debate.” in Between 
Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, ed. Harald Atmanspacher and Robert 
Bishop (Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2002), 325. 
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Macarthur‟s work on scientific naturalism, and that it need not be focused on in terms of 
the free will debate or Heidegger. 
I take the set of basic assumptions identified by Guignon to accurately state the 
ontological presuppositions which result from scientific inquiry, and I identify them with 
the ontological presuppositions which result directly from the acceptance of the 
epistemological theme.  It is my contention, then, that a scientific naturalist who accepts 
the epistemological theme accepts (a) the ontological sparseness characteristic of the 
ontological theme, as well as b) the ontological presuppositions articulated by Charles 
Guignon. 
I feel it is important to make a distinction between scientists and philosophers, 
and by extension, a distinction between scientific inquiry and scientific naturalism.  The 
scientist is often not explicitly concerned with ontology.  The scientist as scientist is 
concerned with experimental methodology, with specific procedures, with scientific 
theories, auxiliary hypotheses, and measurable data.  In addition, the procedures of 
scientific inquiry require that selective emphasis be placed on the specific aspects of the 
world which are most relevant to the particular task at hand.  As a result of this selective 
emphasis, the material irrelevant to the particular task at hand is set aside.  It should be 
noted that, for the scientist, these set-aside elements are only excluded as functionally 
irrelevant. 
However, once the philosopher observes this procedure of selective emphasis, he 
thinks of it in ontological terms, in a way that the scientist does not and would not.  The 
philosopher reifies the objects of scientific inquiry, as well as the scientific procedure of 
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selective emphasis, drawing ontological conclusions from them.  The different manner in 
which the philosopher treats the procedure of selective emphasis accounts for the 
difference between scientists and scientific naturalists, the latter of whom are 
philosophers.   
At this point it may be helpful to summarize what has been presented.  De Caro 
and Macarthur define scientific naturalism according to two core themes, one 
ontological and one epistemological.  While these two themes can be separated, I will 
focus on a critique of epistemological scientific naturalism, which will simply be 
referred to as scientific naturalism as it will be the only version of scientific naturalism 
considered here.  Scientific naturalism is a philosophy which declares that “the world 
consists of nothing but the entities to which successful scientific explanations commit 
us” because “scientific inquiry is, in principle, our only genuine source of knowledge or 
understanding.”  The modern, scientific worldview, as articulated by Guignon, forms the 
basic set of assumptions which man has about the world and his relation to it as a result 
of the historical development of scientific inquiry.  These basic assumptions constitute 
the ontological presuppositions of scientific naturalism. 
According to the scientific naturalist, scientific inquiry has the final ontological 
word, and is the sole arbiter of what does and does not exist.  Behind these explicit 
themes of scientific naturalism lies an implicit notion of experience, as well as an 
implicit notion of what counts as genuine empiricism.  These explicit and implicit claims 
about ontology, empiricism, and experience will be criticized from a Deweyan 
perspective throughout the rest of this section. 
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2.4 Scientific Naturalism and Moral Values 
 
The principal ontological presupposition of the modern, scientific worldview is 
the assumption of a fundamental, ontological dualism between the self and the world, or 
the subject/object dualism.  In the modern era, the problem of knowledge arises as a 
direct result of this fundamental dualism: how can one gain reliable knowledge of an 
ontologically distinct world?  Scientific inquiry is the answer provided by scientific 
naturalism.  But scientific naturalism goes further still.  Scientific naturalism also states 
that not only is scientific inquiry the only reliable source of knowledge, but also that “the 
world consists of nothing but the entities to which successful scientific explanations 
commit us,” namely, that things in the world can only be investigated scientifically.   
The solution to the problem of knowledge offered by scientific naturalism raises 
profound questions for other areas of philosophy, perhaps most notably in moral theory.  
Where do moral qualities fit into this picture?  Where can they be placed within this 
concept of the natural order?  Due to the answer given to the problem of knowledge, that 
scientific inquiry provides the only means of attaining knowledge about the world, 
scientific naturalism cannot place these qualities in the world.  Moral qualities are not 
investigated by scientific inquiry, and because of this, they are not considered to be 
objective in nature.  Since the objects of scientific inquiry are the only objects which can 
be said to be objective in nature, and thus, objects in the real world, moral qualities are 
declared to be subjective in nature; they are not part of the objective world, but they and 
analysis of them belong to the inner, subjective world of the mind, and they are accorded 
inferior ontological status.   
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De Caro and Macarthur call the problem of how to fit moral qualities into a 
scientific conception of the world the placement problem and they attempt to address 
this problem in both of their volumes.  
In contemporary philosophy these issues often find expression in terms of 
the problem of “placing” or “locating” normative phenomena in the 
scientific image of the world.  According to the most common form of 
naturalism, the image of the world provided by the natural sciences it all 
the world there is.  Since this image seems, prima facie, not to include 
normative phenomena, the following question arises: What “place” can 
we find for the normative in the natural world?  The question becomes 
urgent if, as seems highly plausible, we suppose that central normative 
phenomena are not going to be explained away or eliminated.
11
 
 
 However, in both volumes De Caro and Macarthur select contributors only out of 
the analytic tradition
12
 to critique scientific naturalism.  While they acknowledge that 
continental thinkers struggle with the meaning of science no less than do analytic 
thinkers, they clearly prefer to settle the issue “in house,” and select their contributors 
from within the analytic tradition.  While this allows for continuity of assumptions and 
arguments between the thinkers on both sides of the debate, I have long wondered 
whether this issue can be resolved within the analytic framework.  To my mind, it is no 
wonder that moral qualities are not accorded the same degree of reality as scientific 
objects given the manner in which the placement problem is conceived and approached 
in the analytic tradition.  I contend that the placement problem arises not just as a result 
of being scientifically reductionistic, but also from being epistemologically 
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 De Caro and Macarthur, “Science, Naturalism, and the Problem of Normativity”, 2. 
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 De Caro and Macarthur explicitly link the fate of scientific naturalism with the fate of the entire analytic 
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more closely aligned with the fate of contemporary or scientific naturalism.”  From De Caro and 
Macarthur, “Introduction: The Nature of Naturalism”, 1-2. 
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reductionistic.  In other words, a central feature of analytic philosophy is that it reduces 
all empiricism, all experience, to epistemology, and this is the case for both scientific 
and liberal naturalism.  Perhaps for a thorough critique of scientific naturalism to occur, 
one must go outside the analytic tradition.  I don‟t pretend that this claim is absolute, nor 
that it is the only way to embark upon a critique, as De Caro and Macarthur‟s work 
clearly shows.  However, I consider classical American pragmatism, specifically the 
work of John Dewey, to articulate a particularly thorough critique of scientific 
naturalism. 
 The pragmatic version of naturalism articulated by John Dewey addresses the 
placement problem of moral qualities by expounding different notions of experience and 
empiricism, notions which have very different ontological consequences.  More 
specifically, instead of beginning with a notion of empiricism in which all experience is 
reduced to knowledge, Dewey articulates a notion of experience in which epistemology 
is not arbitrary privileged, and therefore the objects of scientific inquiry have no 
ontological exclusivity.  In Dewey‟s immediate empiricism, everything which occurs in 
experience is indicative of a transaction with nature, and consequently, reveals 
something of the nature of nature.  This is as true for empirical moral inquiry as well as 
for scientific inquiry.  Dewey‟s notion of experience yields a much broader empiricism, 
and thus, a much thicker ontology, one in which the placement problem is dissolved 
rather than resolved.  In addition, since the pragmatic tradition is not fixated on knowing 
as the sole mode of experience, Dewey analyzes experience and empiricism in terms of 
primary experience, that is, in terms of the human condition and man‟s ability to deal 
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with problematic situations in their environing conditions, rather than in terms of 
“given” objects of reflection.   
 Scientific inquiry is particularly good at stating and solving the problems which 
are proper to its mode of investigation because of its rigorously empirical methodology.  
However, the fact that scientific inquiry cannot speak to moral problems does not mean 
that these problems do not exist in the world, nor does it mean that they cannot be solved 
empirically.  Dewey‟s inclusive notion of experience and empiricism makes possible a 
naturalistic theory of normative judgments.  Far from making moral qualities mere 
subjective notions, Dewey expounds a general, empirical method of inquiry which 
encompasses both the scientific and moral modes of investigation, both of which reveal 
genuine traits of nature. 
  
2.5 The Epistemological Theme and Epistemic Reductionism 
  
 The epistemological theme states that scientific inquiry is the only genuine 
source of knowledge or understanding.  More specifically this means that it is only by 
following the method of the natural sciences that one arrives at genuine knowledge.  
This amounts to an account of empiricism which equates scientific inquiry with 
knowing, and claims that knowing is the only genuine mode of experience.  Dewey 
rejects the epistemological theme as an instance of intellectualism, or what I have called 
epistemic reductionism.  Epistemic reductionism is the specific claim that “knowing is 
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the sole and only genuine mode of experiencing,”13 and it is the explicit claim that all 
empiricism can be reduced to epistemology.  It is my contention, which I will prove 
throughout the course of this paper that there are no empirical grounds for claiming that 
knowing is the only genuine mode of experiencing.  There are many empirical modes of 
experiencing the world which are not properly called scientific.  Things can be 
experienced morally, aesthetically, politically, religiously, etc., in addition to being 
experienced scientifically, and each of these modes of experiencing have their own 
unique empirical methods of inquiry. 
 From a Deweyan perspective, what the epistemological theme actually states is 
that scientific inquiry is the best method of acquiring a specific kind of knowledge or 
understanding.  While things can be inquired into morally, aesthetically, or politically, it 
is scientific inquiry which yields the best sort of knowledge for mapping the physical, 
causal relations between objects in the world, as well as yielding the best tools, physical 
and mental, by which the physical world can be manipulated and controlled.
14
 
 The content of the epistemological theme restated from the Deweyan perspective 
faces three critiques.  First, the claim that any particular mode of inquiry is better at 
achieving some particular end is a normative judgment, which would mean that value-
free scientific inquiry is originated and regulated by a value judgment.  Second, the 
epistemological theme results in a reductionistic worldview which is not sustainable 
empirically, but instead is justified by metaphysical assumptions.  Third, while the 
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 John Dewey, From “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” in The Philosophy of John Dewey: Two 
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scientific method of inquiry may be the best method possessed for manipulating and 
controlling the natural world when specific kinds of problems arise, there are many other 
kinds of problems that man experiences with and in the world which scientific inquiry is 
simply not designed to address. 
 
2.6 Peter Godfrey-Smith and Dewey 
 
Before discussing these three critiques of epistemic reductionism, I would like to 
take a brief look at the only chapter in De Caro and Macarthur‟s volumes which address 
Dewey‟s work.  In Naturalism and Normativity, many philosophers present their 
understanding of what liberal naturalism could look like.  Peter Godfrey-Smith is the 
only contributor to the volume who addresses Dewey‟s work as it relates to the project 
of liberal naturalism; however, Godfrey-Smith‟s mention of Dewey is once-removed 
from any critique of scientific naturalism. 
 Godfrey-Smith‟s chapter entitled “Dewey, Continuity, and McDowell” highlights 
specific aspects of Dewey‟s thought which are used to critique the work of John 
McDowell, a philosopher who attempts to offer his own form of liberal naturalism.  
Godfrey-Smith describes McDowell‟s work in Mind and World, in which McDowell 
calls for a reconceptualization of what is considered natural.  He claims there is a realm 
of “second nature” which cannot be described by the traditional terminology or 
methodology of naturalism, but which is nonetheless thoroughly naturalistic.  Dewey‟s 
work is brought into the discussion only as a means of gaining a new perspective on 
McDowell‟s project.  The details of how and for what reason‟s Godfrey-Smith brings 
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McDowell and Dewey into dialogue are not important here.  What is revealing is that 
Dewey‟s work is not employed to levy a direct critique of scientific naturalism.  
 My principle assertion in this thesis is that Dewey has his own, robust critique of 
something very much like contemporary scientific naturalism, an assertion with which 
Godfrey-Smith appears to disagree.  Godfrey-Smith does not use Dewey‟s work as a 
starting point for a critique of scientific naturalism in its own right, but instead uses 
Dewey‟s work as part of an “in house” discussion amongst liberal naturalists.  I believe 
this presentation of Dewey fails to properly understand the value and uniqueness of 
Dewey‟s philosophy, and that Dewey should be brought into the contemporary debate 
over scientific naturalism in a direct way.   
 What I believe accounts for Godfrey-Smith‟s treatment of Dewey as a peripheral 
thinker is Godfrey-Smith‟s own analytic viewpoint.  Due to this, Godfrey-Smith fails to 
emphasize a central component of Dewey‟s philosophy, namely, his critique of 
epistemic reductionism, that philosophical position which would claim that knowing is 
the only mode of experience.  He makes mention of Dewey‟s critique of epistemic 
reductionism, and in fact, he devotes significant space to outlining this aspect of 
Dewey‟s thought.  However, he does not at any point use it to critique scientific 
naturalism directly. 
In speaking of the significance Dewey accords man‟s biological interaction with 
the world, Godfrey-Smith mentions “the link to biology is also used to support Dewey‟s 
insistence that our epistemic commerce with the world develops out of various kinds of 
nonepistemic commerce with it and remains embedded within this larger context of 
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interaction.”15  And in another place, Godfrey-Smith makes reference to Dewey‟s 
historical analysis of epistemic reductionism, in which Dewey discusses how epistemic 
reductionism is a result of the ancient Greek reaction to the changing nature of the 
empirical world. 
For Dewey, however, it is in some ways an inescapable fact that 
knowledge, as discussed above, involves use of the stable to deal with the 
unstable.  This fact makes its way into Greek thought in the form of a 
distinction in kinds of being.  The unchanging is regarded as superior and 
more real. 
  
As I understand the argument, Dewey describes two factors at work here.  
One is the treatment of knowledge in isolation from its context within our 
larger nonepistemic traffic with the world.  That makes it possible to treat 
the epistemic roles of various things as reflecting their degree and kind of 
reality.  The second is a forcing of the different epistemic roles of the 
changing and the stable into a framework that treats knowledge as matter 
of contemplation.  Knowledge becomes contemplation of the unchanging, 
and the unchanging acquires a superior kind of reality.
16
 
 
In order to conclude his summary of the relevant features of Dewey‟s work to his 
critique of McDowell, Godfrey-Smith mentions the following with regard to Dewey‟s 
analysis of the dualistic nature of modern philosophy: 
Early in Experience and Nature Dewey notes that everyday experience is 
of objects in the world.  It takes a definite mental operation to sever 
experience from nature and treat the mind as a self-contained domain.  
This is the conception of experience that troubles philosophy, of course, 
but Dewey does not merely see it as a misstep.  The drawing of a line 
between mind and nature in the modern period reflects a new pattern in 
actual epistemic affairs.  Thinking of the mind and the physical world as 
self-sufficient domains turned out to have enormous practical power.  “To 
distinguish in reflection the physical and to hold it in temporary 
detachment is to be set upon the road that conducts to tools and 
technologies, to construction of mechanisms, to the arts that ensue in the 
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wake of the sciences.”  The problem of philosophy has arisen not by 
according the distinction between mind and world a special status but by 
allowing the distinction to “harden” in a particular way.17 
 
These accounts of Dewey‟s philosophy are accurate, and there is no sense in which 
Godfrey-Smith inaccurately reports the central details of Dewey‟s project.  What does 
appear to be the case is that Godfrey-Smith misunderstands the point of Dewey‟s 
project.  While it is true that Dewey did not explicitly author a critique of scientific 
naturalism as here presented, he did critique a notion of experience which would allow a 
philosophy such as scientific naturalism to be viable by supposed empirical standards.  
Given the tenor of Godfrey-Smith‟s treatment of Dewey here, Godfrey-Smith appears to 
see Dewey as sort of “outdated” philosopher of science, someone whose ideas offer 
“valuable vantage points from which to view philosophical problems,” yet also someone 
he regards as representing an “unorthodox” form of naturalism.   
 Godfrey-Smith plainly states that “I do not endorse anything like the whole of 
this package”18 in reference to what he takes to be “Dewey‟s account of mind and 
knowledge, how traditional philosophical problems have arisen, and the proper 
philosophical framing of a naturalistic view.”19  I think there are two reasons for this.  
First, there is my already-stated belief that Godfrey-Smith simply misses the point of 
Dewey‟s project, namely, to critique a notion of experience which could have scientific 
naturalism as one of its potential consequences.  Second, I believe that Godfrey-Smith is 
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operating with the very notion of experience which Dewey critiqued and is therefore 
unwilling to allow the full force of Dewey‟s arguments to gain traction.   
 De Caro and Macarthur acknowledge that they selected contributors from the 
Anglo-American, analytic tradition for their volumes.  As such, Godfrey-Smith would 
necessarily fit into this category and does philosophy from within this tradition.  But the 
notion of experience which Dewey critiques underlies the very tradition of which 
Godfrey-Smith is a part.  This raises a question I asked earlier: can a proper critique of 
scientific naturalism take place from within the analytic tradition?  Or, alternatively, 
would certain ontological presuppositions made by analytic philosophers need to be 
abandoned in order to accurately critique scientific naturalism?  One of these 
presuppositions would involve assumptions about the nature of experience.   
 While Godfrey-Smith is to be applauded for reaching outside his own tradition in 
order to gain “valuable vantage points from which to view philosophical problems,” 
doing so might not be fruitful if one‟s own ontological presuppositions are not 
scrutinized in the process.   
   
2.7 Immediate Empiricism and Epistemic Reductionism 
  
 I return to the three critiques of epistemic reductionism by contrasting epistemic 
reductionism with Dewey‟s own notion of empiricism.  Dewey gives his form of 
empiricism the name immediate empiricism.  By this he means that things [„things‟ is 
the non-technical sense] are what they are experienced to be.  Each encounter with a 
thing has its own quality, its own sense, which determines the manner in which that 
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thing is experienced.  The total situation and circumstances within which engagement of 
a thing occurs determines the manner in which that thing is had, and the kind of quality 
which pervades the engagement determines the manner in which the thing is reflected 
upon, whether epistemically, morally, aesthetically, politically, socially, and so on.   It is 
the had, immediate [i.e. non-mediated] sense of the thing, as opposed to the reflective 
sense, that Dewey means to approximate by the term immediate empiricism. 
 Often saying that “a thing is what it is experienced to be” is interpreted as “a 
thing is what it is known to be.”  These phrases have extremely divergent meanings.  The 
former takes things according to the mode in which they are encountered, as mentioned 
above, within a particular context, situation or problem, and accepts whatever traits, 
qualities or aspects which the thing might reveal as being genuine traits of nature; the 
latter attempts to transform what is experienced into a thing cognized, attempts to make 
it an object of and for knowledge, to interpret it in an exclusively epistemic manner. 
 It is evident that taking objects as they are known yields a specific degree of 
clarity and certainty.  Historically, the pursuit of the epistemic characteristics of things 
has had specific, although diverse, criteria according to which it is judged.  These criteria 
may mean that a known thing is clear and distinct; or is separated out from other things 
for analysis; or that it is abstracted out of its native and naïve context as a mental object; 
or perhaps that it is the only way in which the thing can be stated in a satisfactorily 
rational and linguistic fashion.  It is these characteristics of things as known which 
philosophic and scientific inquiry have historically and perennially sought after. 
  
 
27 
 However, when the epistemic approach is granted priority and privilege over 
other modes of experiencing, this privileging is too often translated as “knowing is the 
sole and only genuine mode of experiencing.”  The conferral of exclusive ontological 
reality to things only as they are known is termed “intellectualism” by Dewey.   
In the assertion (implied here) that the great vice of philosophy is an 
arbitrary “intellectualism,” there is no slight cast upon intelligence and 
reason.  By “intellectualism” as an indictment is meant the theory that all 
experiencing is a mode of knowing, and that all subject-matter, all nature, 
is, in principle, to be reduced and transformed till it is defined in terms 
identical with the characteristics presented by refined objects of science 
as such.
20
 
 
In order to allow Dewey‟s term “intellectualism” to relate more directly to the analysis 
of scientific naturalism, I have referred to the content of this notion with the term 
epistemic reductionism, explicitly defined as the reduction of all experience and 
empiricism to epistemology. 
 There are several questions one can ask concerning epistemic reductionism in 
order to better understand why Dewey rejects this philosophical approach.  First, what 
circumstances motivate epistemic reductionism, or what accounts for this particular 
interpretation of experience?  Second, what are the effects of such a view for experience 
and philosophy, or what kind of philosophical worldview might this view of experience 
yield? 
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2.8 The Moral Motivations of Epistemic Reductionism 
 
Dewey locates the motivations of epistemic reductionism in the human condition.  
Human beings live in a world of stress, uncertainty, and peril.  Humans are creatures 
subject to ever changing environing conditions with perpetually vacillating sets of 
circumstances which require direct, sharp adjustments and adaptations.  The flow 
between those elements in life which are stable and those which are precarious is 
inescapable; no person is immune from the march of change which defines the crux of 
the human condition.    
 The insecurity of man‟s course in the world yields a quest for certainty and 
assurance; those things which can be held to, counted on,  and which are stable and 
immutable, are immensely valuable, and in fact, are of superior value compared to those 
things which are shifting and uncertain.  Certainty has been sought by a variety of 
methods, and a plethora of things have been declared to provide certainty.  Each 
philosopher has his own favored object(s) of certainty.  “The arbitrary character of the 
„reality‟ that emerges is seen in the fact that very different objects are selected by 
different philosophers…That is, whatever strikes a philosopher from the angle of a 
particular problem that presses on him as being self-evident and hence completely 
assured, is selected by him to constitute reality.”21 
They may be mathematical entities, states of consciousness, or sense data.  
[…]  Scholasticism considered that the True and the Good, along with 
Unity, were the marks of Being as such.  […]  There is Spinoza with his 
assurance that a true idea carries truth intrinsic in its bosom; Locke with 
his “simple idea”; Hume with his “impression”; the English neo-realist 
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with his ultimate atomic data; the American neo-realist with his ready-
made essences.
22
 
 
Each of these represents the attempt to identify that which is knowable and therefore 
certain.   
 The comfort provided by the certainty of the epistemic treatment of things is of 
unequalled value.  “Certainty, assurance, is immensely valuable in a world full of 
uncertainty and peril as that in which we live.  As a result whatever is capable of 
certainty is assumed to constitute ultimate Being, and everything else is said to be 
merely phenomenal, or in extreme cases, illusory.”23 
 The mental process by which the epistemic characteristics of objects are elevated 
to such lofty heights is a misapplication of selective emphasis, a principle which 
characterizes all thought.  Thought and reflection analyzes, draws distinctions, abstracts, 
and separates.  The act of identifying information which is pertinent and relevant to a 
specific matter at hand is the hallmark of all thinking.  Typically, irrelevant and 
inconsequential information is cast aside.  There is nothing inherently wrong with this 
procedure; however, when the functional distinctions which reflection draws are treated 
as ontological distinctions, and when the irrelevant is deemed the unreal, the 
“philosophical evil” of epistemic reductionism is apparent.   
In ordinary matters and in scientific inquires, we always retain the sense 
that the materials chosen is selected for a purpose; there is no idea of 
denying what is left out, for what is omitted is merely that which is not 
relevant to the particular problem and purpose in hand.  But in 
philosophies, this limiting condition is often wholly ignored.  It is not 
noted and remembered that the favored subject-matter is chosen for a 
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purpose and that what is left out is just as real and important in its own 
characteristic context.  It tends to be assumed that because qualities that 
figure in poetical discourse and those that are central in friendship do not 
figure in scientific inquiry, they have no reality, at least not the kind of 
unquestionable reality attributed to the mathematical, mechanical or 
magneto-electric properties that constitute matter.  It is natural to men to 
take that which is of chief value to them at the time as the real.  Reality 
and superior value are equated.
24
 
 
 The quest for certainty by which stable objects are accorded superior value, then, 
is the result of a moral judgment, morality here construed in the widest sense possible.  
The choice or decision by which selective emphasis is placed on only the epistemic 
characteristics of an object is an act of normative valuation, one in which something 
perceived as „good‟ is preferred to something „bad‟.  Again, there is nothing inherently 
wrong with making a judgment of this sort, but unfortunately it is often unseen, ignored, 
or denied.  In fact, it reveals an irony; epistemic reductionism, which would seek to grant 
reality only to objects which can be known, which leaves no room for objective moral 
assessment, is generated by a specific moral decision. 
This bias toward treating objects selected because of their value in some 
special context as the “real,” in a superior and invidious sense, testifies to 
an empirical fact of importance.  Philosophical simplifications are due to 
choice, and choice marks an interest moral in the broad sense of concern 
for what is good.
25
 
  
The motivations, then, for affirming epistemic reductionism are environmental 
and moral.  The conditions and circumstances in which the human creature finds 
himself, and the requirement to grow and adapt in the direction of survival, which entails 
a necessary “concern for what is good”, leads some to adhere exclusively to that which 
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appears to provide the most certainty, namely, epistemic and scientific inquiry.  But a 
second question suggests itself: what sort of philosophy does this view of experience 
yield?  
 
2.9 The Philosophical Consequences of Epistemic Reductionism  
  
Dewey claims that epistemic reductionism “accounts for the belief that nature is 
an indifferent, dead mechanism,” despite the fact that nature is not experienced as such.  
Once philosophy treats the world as though it can only, genuinely be known by scientific 
inquiry, this means the world is value-free because scientific inquiry is value-free.
26
   
The isolation of traits characteristic of objects known, and then defined as 
the sole ultimate realities, accounts for the denial to nature of the 
characters which make things lovable and contemptible, beautiful and 
ugly, adorable and awful.  It accounts for the belief that nature is an 
indifferent, dead mechanism; it explains why characteristics that are the 
valuable and valued traits of objects in actual experience are thought to 
create a fundamentally troublesome philosophical problem.
27
 
 
 As was previously stated, the acceptance of the epistemological theme leads 
directly to the ontological theme.  In addition, acceptance of the epistemological theme 
yields other philosophical problems, such as the placement problem.  Moral experiences 
are common to everyone, yet if philosophy privileges knowing as the primary or 
exclusive mode of experience, the nature of other forms of experience become 
problematic.  There is much philosophical maneuvering which must take place in order 
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to account for such experiences, but in the end, scientific naturalism will simply relegate 
them to the subjective realm, and regard them as less real.   
 Dewey‟s philosophy recognizes and celebrates scientific inquiry, but he rejects 
the notion that only scientific inquiry can reveal genuine traits of nature.    
It is important for philosophic theory to be aware that the distinct and 
evident are prized and why they are.  But it is equally important to note 
that the dark and twilight abound.  For in any object of primary 
experience there are always potentialities which are not explicit; any 
object that is overt is charged with possible consequences that are hidden; 
the most overt act has factors which are not explicit.  Strain thought as far 
as we may and not all consequences can be foreseen or made an express 
or known part of reflection and decision.  In the face of such empirical 
facts, the assumption that nature in itself is all of the same kind, all 
distinct, explicit and evident, having no hidden possibilities, no novelties 
or obscurities, is possible only on the basis of a philosophy which at some 
point draws an arbitrary line between nature and experience.
28
 
 
 Dewey calls the philosophical move by which all other empirical modes of 
experiencing are rejected in favor of the epistemic reductionism a “trick of logic.”  Far 
from being anything which scientific inquiry demands of its results, it is the philosopher 
with specific metaphysical (i.e., extraempirical) commitments who demands such 
ontological reductionism.  The scientist as scientist does not engage in such matters; 
they are outside of his discipline and field of expertise.  The philosopher does not grant 
ontological priority to epistemic objects on any particular empirical or scientific 
grounds; he does so due to his own metaphysical and metaphilosophical preferences. 
The same considerations apply to the other objection that was suggested: 
namely, that to view experience naturalistically is to reduce it to 
something materialistic, depriving it of all ideal significance.  If 
experience actually presents aesthetic and moral traits, then these traits 
may also be supposed to reach down into nature, and to testify to 
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something that belongs to nature as truly as does the mechanical structure 
attributed to it in physical science.  To rule out that possibility by some 
general reasoning is to forget that the very meaning and purport of 
empirical method is that things are to be studied on their own account, so 
as to find out what is revealed when they are experienced.  The traits 
possessed by the subject-matters of experience are as genuine as the 
characteristics of sun and electron.  They are found, experienced, and are 
not to be shoved out of being by some trick of logic.  When found, their 
ideal qualities are as relevant to the philosophic theory of nature as are the 
traits found by physical inquiry.
29
 
 
 A philosophy committed to epistemic reductionism will necessarily have 
unempirical foundations.  The immediate empiricism put forth by Dewey is an attempt 
to take seriously the notion of empiricism, by which “the very meaning and purport of 
empirical method is that things are to be studied on their own account, so as to find out 
what is revealed when they are experienced.”  Things are to be treated as they are found 
in experience.  Epistemic reductionism demands that things be conformed to the 
restrictions of scientific inquiry before they are experienced, and if they cannot be, then 
they are discarded as unscientific.  This disdain with which unscientific pursuits are 
treated should be an indication that scientific naturalism is founded on normative 
principles.   
 This philosophical methodology has no empirical foundations, and is not 
affirmed for empirical reasons, but is due to unempirical, metaphysical commitments 
coupled with the normative principles which characterize the quest for certainty.  It 
results in an ontological dualism between man and the world, a dualism which is a 
secondary object of reflection.  If the foundational ontological presupposition of a 
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philosophy cannot be empirically verified, but can only be asserted metaphysically, how 
can this philosophy claim to be empirical in nature? 
 
2.10 Scientific Inquiry and Epistemic Reductionism  
 
 To close this section, a few words need to be said about the Deweyan view of the 
relation between knowledge and scientific inquiry.  In the western tradition, knowledge 
has been defined as justified, true belief.  There are philosophers in the analytic tradition 
who are still working under this epistemic paradigm, attempting to understand how man 
can achieve a true belief with the proper justification given that there is an ontological 
gap between man and the world.   
 The Deweyan conception of knowledge originates from man‟s interaction with 
his environing conditions and is defined empirically by what is found to take place when 
man is seeking and using knowledge. 
It is easy to see what knowledge contributes—namely, the possibility of 
intelligent administration of the elements of doing and suffering.  We are 
about something, and it is well to know what we are about, as the 
common phrase has it.  To be intelligent in action and in suffering 
(enjoyment too) yields satisfaction even when conditions cannot be 
controlled.  But when there is possibility of control, knowledge is the sole 
agency of its realization.  Given this element of knowledge in primary 
experience, it is not difficult to understand how it may develop from a 
subdued and subsidiary factor into a dominant charter.
30
 
 
The desire to control the problematic and uncertain situations man finds himself in 
accounts for the value which knowledge, and any pursuit which can reliably yield 
knowledge, possesses.  This is particularly the case with scientific inquiry, as its great 
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successes in controlling and manipulating the environment have proven to be unmatched 
in human history.  Scientific inquiry is so successful at achieving its desired ends that it 
is no wonder that scientific naturalism claims that scientific inquiry is provides the only 
empirical method capable of unlocking all the secrets which nature might be hiding.   
 But the successes of scientific inquiry are successes of a specific kind. Scientific 
inquiry was only developed to solve one particular kind of problem.  Scientific inquiry 
investigates physical objects in the natural world and the relations between these objects.  
But in scientific investigation, these objects are abstracted out of their larger environing 
conditions. 
The independence of scientific objects from limited and fairly direct 
reference to the environment as a factor in activities of use and 
enjoyment, is equivalent, as has already been intimated, to their abstract 
character.  It is also equivalent to their general character in the sense in 
which the generalizations of science are different from the generalizations 
with which common sense is familiar.  The generality of all scientific 
subject-matter as such means that it is freed from restriction to conditions 
which present themselves at particular times and places.
31
 
 
When objects can be restricted and simplified in such a way that that their relations to 
one another as quantitative, value-free, physical objects becomes apparent, then the 
control of those objects as restricted and simplified is possible.  Of course, it is possible 
to treat objects in the world in this way for particular purposes, namely, the purposes of 
scientific inquiry.  But it is another matter to declare that these objects only possess the 
characteristics that they do when they are treated in this restricted and simplified 
manner.  There are no empirical grounds to make this claim. 
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 From the fact that scientific inquiry is the best method possessed for attaining an 
understanding of the relation between objects in their restricted, simplified, value-free 
sense, it cannot be concluded that scientific inquiry is the only method of empirical 
inquiry available or used.  The claim that scientific inquiry is the only genuine mode of 
inquiry is the methodological parallel to the claim about experience which states that 
knowing is the only genuine mode of experiencing.  These claims simply cannot be 
sustained on empirical grounds, and are the direct result of metaphysical and 
metaphilosophical, normative judgments. 
 In this section I have presented Dewey‟s critique of scientific naturalism in a way 
that analyzes its basic metaphysical and metaphilosophical claims about the nature of 
experience and empiricism.  In section 3, I will present Dewey‟s notion of experience as 
a genuine, empirical alternative to epistemic reductionism.  Dewey‟s immediate 
empiricism yields an ontology which is as thick as his notion of experience, and rejects 
the idea that the placement problem must be resolved in either objective or subjective 
terms. 
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3. DEWEYAN NATURALISM 
 
3.1 Deweyan Naturalism 
 Before discussing how it is that Dewey understands moral qualities to reveal 
genuine traits of nature, I must first highlight several central components of Dewey‟s 
philosophy.  Dewey makes an important, functional distinction between primary and 
secondary experience.  This distinction divides experience in a way which accounts for 
the occurrence of both epistemic experience of the world, and nonreflective, qualitative 
experience of the world.  This distinction is functional in nature, and does not impose an 
unnecessary ontological dualism upon experience, as scientific naturalism does.  Dewey 
gives several examples of the way the distinction between primary and secondary 
experience can be thought of which will not result in a metaphysical rift between 
epistemic and nonreflective, qualitative experience. 
 Next, it is important to understand the particular manner in which primary and 
secondary experience relate to one another, namely, that secondary experience arises as 
a result of problems which occur in primary experience.  When man is considered as an 
organism in perpetual transaction with ever-changing environing conditions, the term 
primary experience can be understood to encompass the normal, everyday transactions 
of man within said environing conditions.  As long as the organism can persist 
comfortably, it can be said that equilibrium has been achieved.  Any loss of this 
equilibrium is immediately felt by the organism.  What was previously a determinate 
situation has become indeterminate, in that the elements and relations between man and 
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the environing conditions no longer hang together in a sure, comfortable manner.  The 
organism cannot simply return to the previous state of equilibrium; man cannot move 
backwards in time.  In order to restore the equilibrium, man must be able to identify 
what about the environing conditions is the cause of the indeterminacy.  In other words, 
he must identify and articulate the problem.  Then, he must come to know what 
organization of future environing conditions could be obtained in order to restore the 
equilibrium.  He must possess the knowledge and ability to bring these future environing 
conditions into being.  This general structure of problem-solving is called the pattern of 
inquiry. 
 The nature of indeterminate situations will vary, which means the nature of 
problems encountered will vary.  What determines the nature of the problem is the 
pervasive quality which runs throughout the process of inquiry.  The moral problem will 
have a much different feel to it than will the scientific problem.  If the problem is 
epistemic and a moral solution is given, it will be dissatisfying and equilibrium is not 
restored.  Pervasive qualities are acutely felt when the wrong sort of solution is offered 
to the problem.  In this way, qualitative considerations regulate all thinking, all inquiry. 
 These felt qualities are not to be identified with subjective feelings.  Felt qualities 
are experienced components of environing conditions and only active change of 
conditions in the environment can bring resolution of the problem, and thus abate the 
force of the experienced quality.   
 Valuation, then, the process of preferring one organization of environing 
conditions to another as a means of ameliorating a specific problem, is subject to 
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empirical investigation.  The means used to bring about the resolution can be tested and 
observed; the ends achieved are also consequences in the world which can be observed.    
The analysis of moral actions in terms of their functional fitness to bring the desired 
resolution is an empirical matter, which can be assessed objectively and through 
observation.  Moral qualities are found in experience and are therefore considered to 
have the same ontological status as any other things found in experience.  
  
3.2 Primary and Secondary Experience 
 
 In his philosophy Dewey makes an important, functional distinction between 
primary and secondary modes of experience.  This distinction is a way of dividing man‟s 
experience of the world in such a way that both reflective and nonreflective experience 
can be account for on equal ontological grounds.  As was seen in the second section, 
scientific naturalism has a notion of experience which is ontologically dualistic, in which 
knowing is taken to be the only genuine mode of experience and all other modes of 
experience are considered subjective, and therefore are accorded an inferior ontological 
status.   
 Dewey‟s notion of experience brings richness to the analysis of experience, 
enlarging and deepening experience rather than restricting and simplifying it as is done 
in scientific naturalism.  Also, this notion of experience takes experience as it actual 
occurs, and does not make any a priori assumptions about the nature of experience.   
“Suppose however that we start with no presuppositions save that what is experienced, 
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since it is a manifestation of nature, may, and indeed, must be used as testimony of the 
characteristics of natural events.”32   
This distinction between primary and secondary experience is tied directly to 
Dewey‟s notion of immediate empiricism, and is best understood in terms of it.  Recall 
that immediate empiricism states that things are what they are found to be.  When a thing 
is engaged or experienced, it shows itself to have certain traits within a particular 
context.   
Hence, if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it 
is experienced as being.  If it is a horse that is to be described, or the 
equus that is to be defined, then must the horse-trader, or the jockey, or 
the timid family man who wants a “safe driver,” or the zoologist or the 
paleontologist tell us what the horse is which is experienced.  If these 
accounts turn out to different in some respects, as well as congruous in 
others, this is no reason for assuming the content of one to be exclusively 
“real,” and that the others to be “phenomenal”; for each account of what 
is experienced will manifest that it is the account of the horse-dealer, or of 
the zoologist, and hence will give the conditions requisite for 
understanding the differences as well as the agreements of the various 
accounts.  And the principle varies not a whit if we bring in the 
psychologist's horse, the logician's horse, or the metaphysician's horse.
33
 
 
Here Dewey not only states that things should be treated as they are found, but that there 
are no firm grounds for claiming that one experience of a horse is more 'real' than any 
other experience of the horse.   
 Primary experience is precisely that mode of experience in which things are 
treated as they are found, and in which “things are to be studied on their own account, so 
as to find out what is revealed when they are experienced.”34  Secondary experience is 
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the reflective, mental process performed upon elements found in and furnished by 
primary experience in order to gain a clearer understanding about the relations between 
them.   
The facts are familiar enough.  They are cited [here] in order to invite 
attention to the relationship between objects of primary and of secondary 
or reflective experience.  That the subject-matter of primary experience 
sets the problems and furnishes the first data of the reflection which 
constructs the secondary objects is evident; it is obvious that test and 
verification of the latter is secured only by return to things of crude or 
macroscopic experience—the sun, the earth, plants and animals of 
common, every-day life.
35
   
 
 The relation between primary and secondary experience is central to 
understanding Dewey‟s notion of experience.  The next example demonstrates that 
primary experience, the mode of experience in which things are non-reflectively had and 
felt, provides the material which becomes the subject-matter of secondary, reflective 
experience.   
 In the following passage, Dewey understands the hearing of a loud, fearsome 
noise and the cognitive identification of the source of the noise as two, distinct, 
temporally separate experiences; however, both are equally real and both are genuinely 
empirical because each is actually experienced. 
I start and am flustered by a noise heard.  Empirically, that noise is 
fearsome; it really is, not merely phenomenally or subjectively so.  That 
is what it is experienced as being.  But, when I experience the noise as a 
known thing, I find it to be innocent of harm.  It is the tapping of a shade 
against the window, owing to movements of the wind.  The experience 
has changed; that is, the thing experienced has changed—not that an 
unreality has given place to a reality…not that truth has changed, but just 
and only the concrete reality experienced has changed.  I now feel 
ashamed of my fright; and the noise as fearsome is changed to noise as a 
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wind-curtain fact, and hence practically indifferent to my welfare.  This is 
a change of experienced existence effected through the medium of 
cognition.  The content of the latter experience cognitively regarded is 
doubtless truer than the content of the earlier; but it is in no sense more 
real.
36
 
 
 These two examples demonstrate the manner in which Dewey means for his 
distinction to be understood.  The passage about various experienced accounts of the 
horse portrays an instance in which a thing can be described from various perspectives, 
none of which can be said to be more real than any other.  The passage concerning a 
fearsome noise which comes to be known as nonthreatening demonstrates that 
experiences can be transformed by the process of reflective inquiry, but that the known 
products of reflective inquiry cannot be said to be more real than are the initial, felt 
experiences from which they originate.  In fact, in the latter example, it becomes clear 
that secondary experience relies upon primary experience for its subject-matter; or, 
stated different, reflective experience can only occur upon elements furnished by 
nonreflective experience.    
 In order to further understand the relationship between primary and secondary 
experience, both modes of experience need to be understood within the existential, 
environing context from which they arise.   
  
3.3 Organism, Environment, and Equilibrium 
 
 To use one of Dewey‟s favorite explanatory tools, man can be understood as an 
organism within an environment.  Not only did he feel that this expression captured the 
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importance of biology for the recovery of an empirical method in philosophy, but that 
the language also emphasizes the organic nature of the intimate transactions which occur 
between man and the world. 
 Dewey takes man‟s experience to be comprised of transactions with his 
environment.  The intercourse which occurs between man and the world, the coming and 
going, living and dying, thriving and struggling, constitutes man's experience.  As such, 
those things which man experiences are taken to be manifestations of the natural world, 
manifestations which reveal generic traits of nature to man, all of which are considered 
equally real. 
 Man is subject to the same biological and physiological demands and drives as 
every natural organism.   
The nature of experience is determined by the essential conditions of life.  
While man is other than bird and beast, he shares basic vital functions 
with them and has to make the same basal adjustments if he is to continue 
the process of living.  Having the same vital needs, man derives the 
means by which he breathes, moves, looks and listens, the very brain with 
which he coordinates his senses and his movements, from his animal 
forbears.  The organs with which he maintains himself in being are not of 
himself alone, but by the grace of struggles and achievements of a long 
line of animal ancestry.
37
 
 
Man may be different from other organisms also found within this biological matrix in 
profound ways, but biology is never left behind and serves as the vehicle through which 
all man‟s desires, demands, and dreams are fulfilled.  There is no aspect of man‟s 
existence which escapes this fundamental and foundational part of his nature.   
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 This vital, biological interaction which man has with the world through his 
environment is characterized by struggle.  The environment in which man is housed does 
not exist for his sake.  It does not exist to serve him.  It must be tamed, adapted to, 
changed, and engaged in such a way as to establish a harmony between organism and 
environment.  It is this sort of biological intercourse with the world which typifies man's 
life and experience, and which can never be escaped or neglected without man‟s 
essential vitality being threatened. 
All the conditions and elements of man‟s experience are determined principally 
by this interaction with the environment; everything he does and everything done to him 
occurs within this environing context.   
Every need, say hunger for fresh air or food, is a lack that denotes at least 
a temporary absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings.  But it is 
also a demand, a reaching out into the environment to make good the lack 
and to restore adjustment by building at least a temporary equilibrium.  
Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step with 
the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it—either 
through effort or by some happy chance.  And, in a growing life, the 
recovery is never mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched by the state 
of disparity and resistance through which it has successfully passed.  If 
the gap between organism and environment is too wide, the creature dies.  
If its activity is not enhanced by the temporary alienation, it merely 
subsists.  Life grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a 
more extensive balance of the energies of the organism with those of the 
conditions under which it lives.
38
 
 
 The needs of the organism initiate a large set of actions undertaken by the 
organism.  When man has harmony with his environment and there are no needs which 
require immediate action or fulfillment, man‟s situation can be described as determinate, 
or in terms of equilibrium.  As soon as needs make demands of man, his situation 
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becomes indeterminate in that a future set of environing conditions which will reinstate 
that lost equilibrium has not yet become apparent.  It is the case that many needs can be 
satisfied with little or no effort.  If the need can be readily fulfilled by objects directly 
available in the environment, no true problem develops.  If the need cannot be so directly 
and immediately fulfilled, then the situation is indeterminate, and will remain so until a 
resolution is found.  An indeterminate situation which requires further investigation in 
order to be resolved necessitates the institution of an inquiry, which is an intentional 
process of reflectively engaging the relevant elements in the environment to bring about 
resolution.    
The rhythm of loss of integration with environment and recovery of union 
not only persists in man but becomes conscious with him; its conditions 
are material out of which he forms purposes.  Emotion is the conscious 
sign of a break, actual or impending.  The discord is the occasion that 
induces reflection.  Desire for restoration of the union converts mere 
emotion into interest in objects as conditions of realization for harmony.
39
   
 
 Reflection, then, is the result of a particular disruption in, or loss of equilibrium 
with, the environment.  Man‟s goal is to restore the previous, happy circumstances in 
which the distress and angst of the indeterminate situation were not present.  But man 
cannot go backwards to some antecedent time.  He must proceed forward into the future, 
and must look to establish equilibrium there.  As such, he must seek to change the 
current indeterminate environing conditions which constitute the indeterminate situation 
into those which will once again be pleasant.  This can only be achieved through 
reflection, that is, by assessing the cause of the current disruption and identifying the 
means of action which would bring about its resolution.  Only through reflection can 
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man imagine and hypothesize future environing conditions which would restore the lost 
equilibrium. 
 
3.4 The Pattern of Inquiry 
  
 Here I want provide a more general account of how reflection arises out of 
primary experience.  Dewey called this process the pattern of inquiry.  This pattern 
should be understood as a formalization of what takes place in all concrete, empirical 
inquiries. 
 Before an inquiry can be instituted, there are several antecedent conditions which 
obtain in order to constitute a genuinely indeterminate situation.  The first of these 
conditions is that there must be something about the particular situation which is 
puzzling or questionable.  “The peculiar quality of what pervades the given materials, 
constituting them a situation, is not just uncertainty at large; it is a unique doubtfulness 
which makes that situation to be just and only the situation it is.”  The second condition 
is that the situation itself which must be inherently doubtful.   
It is the situation that has these traits.  We are doubtful because the 
situation is inherently doubtful.  Personal states of doubt that are not 
evoked by and are not relative to some existential situation are 
pathological; when they are extreme they constitute the mania of 
doubting.  Consequently, situations that are disturbed and troubled, 
confused or obscure, cannot be straightened out, cleared up and put in 
order, by manipulation of our personal states of mind.  The attempt to 
settle them by such manipulations involves that psychiatrists call 
“withdrawal from reality.”  Such an attempt is pathological as far as it 
goes, and when it goes far it is the source of some form of actual insanity.  
The habit of disposing of the doubtful as if it belonged only to us rather 
than to the existential situation in which we are caught and implicated is 
an inheritance from subjectivistic psychology.  The biological antecedent 
conditions of an unsettled situation are involved in that state of imbalance 
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in organic-environmental interactions which has already been described.  
Restoration of integration can be effected, in one case as in the other, only 
by operations which actually modify existing conditions, not merely 
“mental” processes.40 
 
And finally, the third condition is that the situation must be able to be acted upon, to be 
influenced in one direction or another.  The course of events which might transpire in the 
environment must be alterable as to their future consequences.  A situation in which no 
action can be taken to bring about different future consequences is already a determinate 
situation, in one sense at least.   
 An indeterminate situation can be called a problematic situation once it is 
recognized and articulated as such, and this process is called the institution of a problem.  
Previously, the indeterminate situation is merely precognitive; it exists in the 
environment, but may not yet have been recognized as posing a threat, or be understood 
as something which requires rigorous investigation.  At this point it has been felt, but all 
its implications have not yet been reflectively assessed.  Once an indeterminate situation 
is recognized as a problem, it becomes a problematic situation. 
A problem represents the partial transformation by inquiry of a[n] 
[indeterminate] situation into a determinate situation.  It is a familiar and 
significant saying that a problem well put is half-solved.  To find out 
what the problem and problems are which a problematic situation 
presents to be inquired into, is to be well along in inquiry. [...]  Without a 
problem, there is blind groping in the dark.
41
 
 
 The next stage in the pattern of inquiry is called the determination of a problem-
solution.  First, observations must be made of those elements of the situation which are 
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settled or determined in existence.  An indeterminate situation is never wholly and 
completely indeterminate.  There are also elements of the situation which are familiar 
and stable due to previous inquiry and experience.  Second, a possible solution in the 
form of an idea may present itself.  As a possible solution, this idea will suggest that the 
materials of the given situation be transformed into a new arrangement which will yield 
particular, desired consequences in the future, which are as yet unrealized.  And third, 
the idea is examined for its functional-fitness, which means its ability to offer a genuine 
solution to the problem. 
 A few more words need to be said about this last component in which an idea is 
examined for its functional-fitness.  The process by which an idea is evaluated as to its 
relevancy as a possible solution to the established problematic situation is called 
reasoning.   In reasoning, the idea (possible solution) is weighed in light of all the 
observed facts known about the circumstances in order to determine its functional-fitness 
for bringing resolution to the problem.  If the idea does not consider all the facts which 
come to light, it may not be thorough or complete enough to accurately map the future 
conditions which need to obtain to bring about resolution of the problem.  Or, if the idea 
considers the wrong kinds of fact about the situation, the idea may bring resolution to a 
particular problem, just not pressing problem of the current indeterminate situation. 
  The phrase of the pattern of inquiry called the determination of a problem-
solution can be summarized by saying that a concrete, empirical inquiry must obtain a 
relevant and appropriate solution to a specific problematic situation; observation of 
settled traits in existence must occur so that firm grounds upon which an inquiry might 
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be built can be established; a possible solution (or idea) must arise from reflection on 
those settled traits and be weighed against other possible solutions (other ideas) which 
might also be a functional fit for the problem; the idea must be put in action in order to 
resolve the problematic situation in such a way that the solution brings resolution to the 
original need from which the problematic situation arose.   
 
3.5 Pervasive Qualities and Subjective Feelings 
 But how are problematic situations and the pattern of inquiry experienced?  
Dewey has already spoken of “emotion [as] the conscious sign of a break, actual or 
impending.”  The language of emotion begins to suggest what Dewey means by had and 
felt experience.  But Dewey also speaks in terms of pervasive qualities.  “The peculiar 
quality of what pervades the given materials, constituting them a situation” is one 
mention of qualities in conjunction with the pattern of inquiry.  Dewey discusses 
qualities more extensively in other places.  
When it is said that I have a feeling, or impression, or “hunch,” that 
things are thus and so, what is actually designated is primarily the 
presence of a dominating quality in a situation as a whole, not just the 
existence of a feeling as a psychical or psychological fact.  To say I have 
a feeling or impression that so and so is the case is to note that the quality 
in question is not yet resolved into determinate terms and relations...But 
something presents itself as problematic before there is recognition of 
what the problem is.  The problem is had or experienced before it can be 
stated or set forth; but it is had as an immediate quality of the whole 
situation.  The sense of something problematic, of something perplexing 
and to be resolved, marks the presence of something pervading all 
elements and considerations.
42
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Reflection is the process by which a problematic situation is identified and stated.  Prior 
to this act of reflection, however, there is the felt disturbance of things as indeterminate.  
Recall that an indeterminacy or problem in the environment is identified by emotion, 
which is the conscious sign of a break with the environment.  This break is not thought, 
but it is felt.  It is the felt, emotional acknowledgement of a break of a certain kind with 
the environment.  The nature, or force, of the kind of break which is encountered is the 
quality possessed by the break.  It is this qualitative break which determines what set of 
appropriate responses and active engagement the world requires of man in order for him 
to restore equilibrium with his environment, and which will characterize all man‟s 
efforts to bring the problem to resolution.  In fact, the resolution of the problem will 
result in the abating of the quality‟s influence.  Whether this is called emotional, 
affective, inchoate, or qualitative, it is clear that Dewey thinks of primary experience as 
embodying this kind of nonreflective, nonepistemic core.   
 However, these qualities are not subjective.  In order to speak of qualities as 
subjective, one must first affirm the dualism of subject and object as it is articulated by 
scientific naturalism.  Scientific naturalism assumes a fundamental dualism between man 
and the world, subject and object, and then addresses the placement problem, that is, 
where qualities and values are to be located.  Since they are not investigated or revealed 
by scientific inquiry, they cannot be said to inhabit the world; they are not intrinsic 
qualities of things.  Therefore, scientific naturalism locates moral qualities on the 
subject-side of the dualism, accords them inferior ontological status, identifying them 
with subjective, mental states or personal feelings.   
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 Dewey rejects this dualism, and consequently, he rejects that moral qualities 
must be located either in an antecedently independent world or in a subject‟s mind.  This 
dichotomy is a false dichotomy which forces artificial ontological categories onto 
philosophy, and thus onto moral theory.   
 These qualities are not subjective; they are characteristic of a set of environing 
conditions; they are something which is experienced, but they are not subjective mental 
states.   
It is an old saying that the gods were born of fear.  The saying is only too 
likely to strengthen a misconception bred by confirmed subjective habits.  
We first endow man in isolation with an instinct of fear and then we 
imagine him irrationally ejecting that fear into the environment, scattering 
broadcast as it were, the fruits of his own purely personal limitations, and 
thereby creating superstition.  But fear, whether an instinct or an 
acquisition, is a function of the environment.  Man fears because he exists 
in a fearful, an awful world.  The world is precarious and perilous…It 
was not fear of gods that created the gods.
43
 
 
It is clear that the procedure by which qualities are relegated to the subjective begins 
with taking man in isolation from his environing conditions, as though he had antecedent 
independent reality apart from the world.  Empirically (scientifically) this is not the case.  
The fact that man can be reflectively and functionally distinguished from the rest of 
nature does not mean that he is in fact independent of it.  The act of rendering this 
functional distinction as ontological and then proceeding to address the placement 
problem, coupled with the commitment to epistemic reductionism, naturally leads to 
treating qualities as subjective. 
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 It is no wonder that moral experience is considered a subjective matter when 
most of the entities with which morality is purported to involve (i.e., mental states, 
beliefs, dispositions, and attitudes) are unempirical in nature.  Dewey‟s functional 
distinction between primary and secondary experience clearly identifies these entities as 
resultants from the process of reflection, yet they are treated as „given,‟ or as the 
fundamental data of moral experience by scientific naturalism.  When the given entities 
of moral experience are unempirical in nature, all moral philosophy will also be 
considered unempirical in nature. 
 One might think that perhaps Dewey identifies the environing conditions which 
give rise to subjective mental states as the fundamental data of moral experience, but this 
is not the case.  First, Dewey is not concerned with subjective mental states as though 
they were the fundamental data of moral experience.  Any treatment of mental states 
must by necessity be unempirical because these states are not subject to empirical 
investigation.  What is subject to empirical investigation in moral experience are moral 
problems, moral actions, and moral valuations.  It is actions and the ends produced by 
them within the context of a moral inquiry which are judged to be morally good or 
otherwise.  An empirical investigation of moral subject-matter must take place in terms 
of the active means and ends-in-view.  The mental states, beliefs, dispositions, and 
attitudes of mentalistic and subjectivistic morality can only be empirical when they 
become actions in the world; until that point, they are something like transcendental 
entities, and are merely the necessary conditions of moral action, a view I assume no 
scientific naturalist would explicitly endorse, yet does so implicitly at every stage.     
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 What has just been said demands a more thorough analysis in terms of moral 
inquiry, an analysis which will occur shortly.  Here I am concerned with making clear 
that Dewey does not think moral quality and moral traits are subjective in nature.    
The world in which we immediately live, that in which we strive, 
succeed, and are defeated is preeminently a qualitative world.  What we 
act for, suffer, and enjoy are things in their qualitative determinations.  
This world forms the field of characteristic modes of thinking, 
characteristic in that thought is definitely regulated by qualitative 
considerations.
44
 
 
The qualitative nature of man‟s experience with the world is primary, is most 
fundamental.  When things are experienced, acted upon, suffered and enjoyed, it is in 
this qualitative manner.  All thought and reflection are instigated by processes and 
relations within this qualitative world and return to it in order to act upon the qualitative 
determinations of things. 
 To say that action, suffering, and enjoyment are of things in their qualitative 
determinations is to say that things are genuinely experienced as primary, as felt, or had.  
Scientific naturalism will refer to these felt qualities as feelings, and will once again 
speak of them subjectively.  This viewpoint, again, treats the subject as though it has an 
antecedent and independent reality apart from and prior to his environing conditions.  
This presentation of qualities as feelings can only occur in a philosophy which assumes 
(a) a fundamental dualism between man and the world and (b) assumes that engagement 
with the world begins within man and then extends outward into the world, again, as 
though man and the world were ontologically separated a priori, which accounts for the 
notion that qualities are projected onto the world. 
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If we designate this permeating qualitative unity [of experience] in 
psychological language, we say it is felt rather than thought.  Then, if we 
hypostatize it, we call it a feeling.  But to term it a feeling is to reverse the 
actual state of affairs.  The existence of unifying qualitativeness in the 
subject-matter defines the meaning of “feeling.”  The notion that “a 
feeling” designates a ready-made independent psychical entity is a 
product of a reflection which presupposes the direct presence of quality as 
such.
45
   
 
Qualities, then, are best spoken of as felt, not as feelings. 
 Dewey rejects the dualism between subject and object, and he rejects the 
artificial ontological categories forced on moral philosophy; therefore, he necessarily 
rejects qualities as strictly subjective or objective in nature.  A subjective understanding 
of qualities treats qualities as mentalistic projections onto an antecedently independent 
world; a strictly objective understanding of qualities would treat them as innate or 
intrinsic to things in the world, as though God created these objects to possess these or 
those specific qualities.  In moral discourse, the objective understanding of qualities 
would identify objects or actions as intrinsically good or evil.  Dewey rejects both the 
subjective and objective characterization of qualities as unempirical.   
 Dewey‟s notion of qualities locates them in experience, not in the subject as 
mental entities or in the world as intrinsic parts of objects.   Experience is the conscious 
awareness of transactions between man and the world.  Experiential transactions are 
transactions in and with nature, and the traits revealed by these transactions, whether 
qualitative or reflective, are manifestations of nature.  I acknowledge that there is not 
much by way of argument.  Simply saying that qualities are found in experience, 
therefore they are real, might not be enough to convince a person who already holds to 
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scientific naturalism.  But isn‟t this the nature of all empirical claims, particularly the 
claims of scientific inquiry?   
 Empiricism is the claim that things are experienced.  The achievements of 
scientific inquiry been accomplished because centuries ago, people begin to look directly 
at what they were experiencing, casting off millennia of traditional theory and 
mythologizing.   
Experience, if scientific inquiry is justified, is no infinitesimally thin layer 
or foreground of nature, but that is penetrates into it, reaching down into 
its depths, and in such a way that its grasp is capable of expansion; it 
tunnels in all directions and in so doing brings to the surface things at first 
hidden—as miners pile high on the surface of the earth treasures brought 
from below.  Unless we are prepared to deny all validity to scientific 
inquiry, these facts have a value that cannot be ignored for the general 
theory of the relation of nature and experience.
46
       
 
Therefore, it is no small claim to say that something is real simply because it is had in 
experience.  That is the essence of all empiricisms.  The difference between scientific 
naturalism and the empirical naturalism articulated by Dewey is that empirical 
naturalism makes no arbitrary, ontological distinctions within experience due to a priori 
metaphysical commitments; empirical naturalism claims to be thoroughly empirical, and 
radically so.   
In the natural sciences there is a union of experience and nature which is 
not greeted as a monstrosity; on the contrary, the inquirer must use 
empirical method if his findings are to be treated as genuinely scientific.  
The investigator assumes as a matter of course that experience, controlled 
in specifiable ways, is the avenue that leads to the facts and laws of 
nature.
47
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That there is continuity between what is found in experience and what is found in nature 
is the most foundational assumption of scientific inquiry.  Scientifically, what is found in 
experience is the result of transaction between man and the world.  There are no 
empirical grounds, only metaphysical ones, for the additional claim that scientific 
inquiry is the only genuine mode of experiencing the world.    
But candid regard for scientific inquiry also compels the recognition that 
when experience does occur…it enters into possession of some portion of 
nature.
48
 
 
 
3.6 Moral Inquiry and the Placement Problem 
 
 It is now appropriate to turn to Dewey‟s empirical notion of moral inquiry in 
order to provide, by way of example, an indication of what form an empirical inquiry, 
which is not considered scientific, would have.  Empirical moral inquiry as conceived by 
Dewey provides the clearest example of a genuine mode of investigation and a genuine 
mode of inquiry which is empirical, but which is not scientific.  Granted, it is not my 
task to give a complete account of Dewey‟s moral philosophy, as such is beyond the 
scope of this project.  Here I only intend to present an upshot of Deweyan moral inquiry 
in order to motivate the claim that scientific inquiry is not the only genuine mode of 
empirical investigation available. 
 A morally indeterminate situation arises as the result of a consciously felt, 
emotional realization that a proper future course of action is not immediately apparent 
because particular moral obligations are in irreconcilable conflict.  This conflict is not 
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the conflict between good and bad, right and wrong, beneficial or damaging; it is the 
conflict between diverse obligations, some of which are understood in terms of duty, 
others in terms of virtue, or the good.  The conflict arises because each of these ideals is 
morally valued, yet their demands initially appear to call for different, irreconcilable 
courses of action.  Moral valuation is the reflective process of adjudicating between 
these irreconcilable, morally valued courses of action, each of which is nothing less than 
a future set of environing conditions which bring resolution to the initial morally 
problematic situation.  In addition, moral valuation is the process of assessment of these 
various, potential ends-in-view for their practical, functional fitness to solve the initial 
moral problem in light of these diverse, yet relevant moral obligations.  This entire 
process by which a moral problem is brought to resolution by implementing the morally 
preferred ends-in-view through morally approved means (a course of actions) is what is 
meant by the term moral inquiry.   
 Moral inquiry, as here described, is a thoroughly empirical process.  It is 
assessment and manipulation of environing conditions in light of moral obligations, just 
as scientific inquiry is assessment and manipulation of environing conditions in light of 
epistemic concerns. 
 Indeterminate situations arise as a result of a felt break in equilibrium with the 
environment.  It should be noticed that this entails that indeterminate situations are 
specific, individual occurrences.  In a moral context, this means that morally 
indeterminate situations, and the subsequent morally problematic situation which results 
from it, are specific and isolated, not general.  “A radical empiricist approach to the 
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nature of moral problems seeks a…description of what moral problems are experienced 
as rather than an essence or a definition of moral problems.  We do not, after all, 
experience moral problems in general.”49  
 The consciously emotional break with the environment is the awareness of an 
irreconcilable conflict which brings active progress to a halt.  The next step in a process 
is not apparent, whether that process is a particular undertaking or life in general.  Or, 
there is hesitation to complete the next stage or phrase of the project because it has 
become clear that there are different demands to which one is accountable, demands 
which seem to be incompatible in that they would each require a different course of 
action to be fulfilled.  
 The conflict which exists is between various ideals which are valued morally.  It 
is not a conflict between good and bad, or right and wrong.  The conflict exists because 
the various relations one has with objects and persons in the world create various 
obligations, or manners in which an individual is responsible to or for others.  These 
obligations can be characterized differently, as instances of required duty, or the 
obligation to be virtuous, or obligation to what is good, however this may be understood.  
Each of these responsibilities may demand a particular course of action if one is to fulfill 
the responsibility, but they may also prohibit other courses of actions and if these 
prohibited courses of actions are demanded by other moral responsibilities or 
obligations, the conflict is apparent.  Which set of obligations, responsibilities, and 
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actions ought one pursue given that different sets of obligations, responsibilities and 
actions may be irreconcilable? 
 Moral valuation is the reflective process by which one attempts to decide which 
of these morally valued courses of action are to be undertaken in light of conflicting 
moral obligations.  Central to moral valuation is the idea that these courses of action are 
not yet been undertaken, that they are future courses of action.  A „course of action‟ is a 
series of actions which will bring about a future set of environing conditions.  Notice 
that the essence of the morally problematic situation is a halt in action.  No action is 
resumed until a particular course of action is judged morally appropriate.  As such, the 
action to be performed has not yet been realized and lies in the future.  The action, or 
course of action, is an end-in-view, and it is various ends-in-view which are in conflict, 
for different ends-in-view may be demanded by different moral obligations.  Moral 
valuation, then, is the assessment of various ends-in-view according to their implications 
for various moral obligations.  
 This whole process from the recognition of the morally indeterminate situation, 
the identifications of the moral problem as the specific conflict between various 
obligations, and the reflective procedure of weighing the various obligations and their 
implications for future action in moral valuation is moral inquiry.  How this moral 
pattern of inquiry resolves particular moral problems is beyond the scope of this 
particular thesis.  What is central here is that this entire process of moral inquiry is 
experienced and is empirical. 
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 The goal or purpose of empirical moral inquiry cannot be to understand the moral 
structure of the universe, nor can it be to help a moral agent realize that suffering is 
merely an illusion.  Empirical moral inquiry is about improving the circumstances of the 
agent and others by effecting change in the world by solving morally problematic 
situations.  This instrumentalist understanding of morality may dissatisfy some, but no 
more than the instrumental understanding of scientific inquiry will dissatisfy the person 
who has embarked on the quest for certainty.  Empirically, however, these instrumental 
conceptions of both scientific and moral inquiry are all that can be claimed.  Certainly 
one can entertain realist interpretations of both scientific and moral inquiry, but one does 
so because he finds this metaphysical viewpoint satisfying in some way.   
 Empirical verification of the products of moral valuation occurs in the same 
manner that empirical verification of the prediction of future events occurs.  If someone 
says they can predict the future, one assesses a particular prediction and then waits for 
the predicted set of environing conditions to either obtain or not.
50
  The point is that what 
needs to be verified can be experienced, and is thus subject to empirical verification.  
The same can be said for moral valuation of ends-in-view.  When these ends were 
brought about, did they bring resolution to the situation?  There is nothing about the 
pattern of moral inquiry which guarantees that an individual will be a competent moral 
agent, but his solutions can be observed and assessed as to their ability to bring about 
resolution.  Thus, this process is thoroughly empirical. 
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 The manner in which the process of moral inquiry is empirical is the same 
manner in which scientific inquiry is judged to be empirical, though the subject-matters 
of each inquiry are vastly different.  A scientifically indeterminate situation is one in 
which a physical linkage of causes and effect in the world is not fully understood.  What 
causes one thing to be or occur as opposed to another is not apparent.  The precise 
source of the indeterminacy is articulated as a problem.  Various scientific procedures 
for further assessment and manipulation of the physical elements of the problem are 
suggested, considered, and selected.  This process is usually repeated and proceeds over 
a lengthy period of time until either a particular cause-effect relationship can be given or 
until it is realized that larger scientific assumptions about the physical world may need to 
be revised given the initial physical problem.  If the initial problematic situation is 
resolved by the scientific explanation suggested, then the scientific inquiry has been 
successful.   
 In the same way that scientific inquiry lays bare and reveals the physical relations 
of nature, moral inquiry reveals the moral relations of nature, where moral relations are 
understood in terms of naturalistic obligations and responsibilities for action.  There is 
nothing supernatural about these obligations and responsibilities, nor is there anything 
transcendental.  These obligations and responsibilities to act in specific ways are not 
mental entities, but they describe the social and communal relations between natural 
organisms, namely, human beings.  As human beings relate to one another within the 
context of friendship, familial bonds, as colleagues, or members of particular 
organizations, or members of society, various responsibilities arise and proper moral 
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action demands that these responsibilities and obligations be assessed and balanced 
when they come in conflict.  These moral relations are as much a part of human 
experience as are physical realities, each of which requires their own characteristic 
modes of reflection when problems arise.  These modes of reflection constitute different 
forms of inquiry for resolving problematic situations, inquiries which Dewey believes 
can be thoroughly empirical in each case. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
 I began this thesis with the intent of criticizing the ontological sparseness of 
scientific naturalism from a Deweyan perspective.  As I conceived it, this entailed not 
only offering a good critique of scientific naturalism, but also offering a plausible, 
alternative ontology to that offered by scientific naturalism.  A complete account of 
Dewey‟s ontology and philosophy could not be given here; however, it was my intention 
to reinterpret the placement problem in light of Deweyan naturalism, a philosophical 
tradition which has as much respect for empiricism and science as scientific naturalism.  
In fact, it should be clear that the metaphilosophical presuppositions of Dewey‟s 
naturalism are nothing less than a commitment to be thoroughly empirical in all things, 
something which cannot be said of scientific naturalism.  
 It has been my intention to examine the metaphysical assumptions of scientific 
naturalism in order to induce a more critical attitude toward this philosophical tradition, 
and in order to curb the philosophical dogmatism which is creeping into mainstream 
Anglo-American philosophy.  By way of a conclusion, I would like to summarize the 
Deweyan critique of scientific naturalism, paying particular attention to the relationship 
between the various key elements of the critique: ontology, inquiry, and experience. 
 Ontological sparseness is the core metaphysical commitment of scientific 
naturalism.  Ontological sparseness was defined by the ontological theme of De Caro 
and Macarthur: that one should be ontologically committed only to those objects which 
successful scientific explanations commit one.  The natural sciences are the disciplines 
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by which elements of the natural world are treated in terms of their physical and causal 
relations to one another, though doing science requires more than just physical objects.  
Quantifications, measurement, explanations, predictions, and the like are the mental 
tools of the scientist, which means that the entities required to perform these operations 
must be accounted for as well, namely, propositions, numbers, and conception, along 
with the rules of inference and applicable logical systems.  However, scientific 
naturalism would be cautious about attributing ontological reality to any other entities 
without much investigation. 
 This metaphysical commitment to ontological sparseness is justified by appealing 
to the epistemological theme of scientific naturalism, or the notion that it is only by 
following the methods of the natural sciences that one arrives at genuine knowledge.  
Knowledge is here taken to mean the ability to determine what is in the world and how 
those things in the world relate to one another. This means that the scientific 
understanding of the world is the only correct understanding of the world, and while the 
world is amenable to many other interpretations or ways of being understood and 
experienced, all other interpretations of the world are subjective, not objective, in nature. 
 Implicit to the epistemological theme is commitment to a specific view of human 
experience.  According to scientific naturalism throughout the long, historical 
development of scientific inquiry, other competing interpretations of human experience 
of the world have been rejected.  The modern, scientific worldview has replaced all other 
interpretations of how the world could be, or could be experienced.  Since it is the case 
that scientific inquiry is the only genuine mode of determining what there is in the 
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world, it is not a far reach to assume that knowing is the only genuine mode of 
experience.  This is precisely what Dewey calls Intellectualism, the reduction of all 
experience to epistemology. 
 For my purposes, scientific naturalism is understood as a contemporary 
occurrence of Intellectualism.  There are no empirical grounds for making the claim that 
knowing is the only genuine mode of experience.  As has been seen, the world is not 
primarily experienced as known; the world is not given as known.  It is primarily 
experienced as had or felt.  Knowing, or seeking knowledge, is but one mode of 
experience which arises out of this felt, had, qualitative experience.  The exclusive 
privileging of knowledge is not the result of empirical investigation of the content and 
structure of experience.  The exclusive privileging of knowledge is the result of the quest 
for certainty, the seeking after the stable elements of a precarious world which his ever 
changing.   
 Through the Deweyan critique the quest for certainty is recognized as a pursuit of 
those elements of the environment which allow for a happy harmony amidst the peril.  
But Dewey also makes it clear that man experiences the world in modes as other than as 
known, and that he seeks to establish and maintain harmony with the world through a 
variety of means, of which knowing is only one.  Thus, Dewey articulates a notion of 
human experience which includes all the modes in which the world is actually 
experienced.  This notion of human experience is called immediate empiricism. 
 The rejection of Intellectualism is the rejection of the notion of human 
experience in which knowing is the only genuine mode of experience.  Since knowing is 
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not the only genuine mode of experience, scientific inquiry can no longer be considered 
to be the determinant of what there is in the world (nature).  According to Dewey‟s 
immediate empiricism, things are what they are experienced to be.  This means that 
those things which are found in experience reveal genuine traits of nature, and if moral 
qualities and values are experienced, then nature genuinely has moral traits.  As different 
traits of nature are identified, appropriate modes of inquiry for each subject-matter will 
be developed.  The form, practice, and history of scientific inquiry are untouched, even 
if Dewey‟s pattern of inquiry has certain instrumentalist overtones.  This, though, is a 
topic for another day.  What remains to be done is to develop empirical modes of inquiry 
which will treat moral, aesthetic, or political experience as revealing genuine traits of 
nature, rather than being merely subjective pursuits. 
    The reasons for rejecting ontological sparseness become clear.  Scientific inquiry 
is not longer the standard by which ontology is determined.  There are more things found 
in experience than are dreamt of in scientific naturalism.  Dewey‟s commitment is to 
immediate empiricism, and as such, something being found in experience is good 
grounds for asserting its existence and including it in an ontological account of the 
world.  
 This critique addresses the placement problem in two ways.  First, it removes the 
ontological dualism upon which the problem was built.  With the disappearance of the 
ontological distinction between subject and object, the original concern which motivated 
the placement problem has also disappeared.  Second, according to the new pragmatist 
ontology, things are as they are experienced to be.  If the world is experienced as moral, 
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then moral qualities and moral values must be included in any naturalistic account of the 
world.  As such, Dewey not only offers an empirical account of inquiry into moral 
experience, but he also provides a naturalistic foundation for moral qualities and values. 
 I take Dewey‟s critique of scientific naturalism to be a robust critique of the 
entire analytic tradition, liberal naturalism included, in as much as I identify the analytic 
tradition with epistemic reductionism.  While the versions of liberal naturalism which 
appear in De Caro and Macarthur‟s volumes are attempting to articulate a version of 
naturalism which is not scientifically reductionistic, they are still being epistemically 
reductionistic.  Like the scientific naturalism they attempt to critique, these versions of 
liberal naturalism still reduce all experience to epistemology, as though knowing was the 
sole and only genuine mode of experience.   
 Clearly, Dewey is not a liberal naturalist, and cannot be properly understood in 
this context.  If liberal naturalism truly wishes to address the root causes of the 
placement problem, as well as suggest a stronger solution, then it should take Dewey‟s 
critique of epistemic reductionism on its own terms. 
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